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Abstract. Many peer-to-peer (P2P) applications benefit from node specialisation. For example, the  use
of supernodes, the  semantic clustering of  media  files or  the  distribution  of  different  computing  tasks
among nodes. We describe simulation experiments with a simple selfish re-wiring protocol  (SLAC) that
can spontaneously  self-organise networks into  internally  specialized groups (or  “tribes”).  Peers  within
the  tribes pool their  specialisms, sharing tasks and  working  altruistically as a  team  –  or  “tribe”  even
though their individual behaviour is selfish. This approach  is scalable, robust and self-organising. These
results have implications and applications in many disciplines and areas beyond P2P systems.
1.   Introduction
Open Peer-to-Peer  (P2P)  networks (in the  form of applications  on-top  of the  internet)  have become
very  popular  for  file  sharing  applications  (e.g.  Kazaa2,  Gnutella3,  Bittorrent4).  However,  can  such
technology  be applied to  other  computing tasks? For example consider a system in which some nodes
have lots of free storage, some high bandwidth and others  non-firewalled connections  to  the  network.
Those  nodes could cooperate  to  provide  a  data  back-up  service  –  something  that  no  individual node
could provide. Obviously, in such a situation, if there is demand for a back-up service we would wish the
nodes to, somehow, get together and provide the service – but how?
One solution (and currently, it would seem, the only viable one for deployable applications) is to  code
the process of specialisation, coordination and cooperation into the protocol  directly for each different
kind  required. So for  example,  where  semantic  clustering  of  media  files  is  required  for  file  sharing,
protocols  exist  that  implement  it5  (Handurukande  et  al  2004).  Where  systems  require  supernodes
(Montresor 2004), again, these are implemented directly. There  are  tow problems with this approach;
firstly,  for  every  kind  of  specialisation  required a  programmer  must  envisage  this  a  priori, design  a
protocol  then  implement  and test  it. Secondly, since this process is complex  enough on  its  own,  it  is
generally assumed that nodes will follow the protocol – it is rare to find protocols robust to  node failure,
noise or malicious behaviour, such as free riding, although this is, to  a  certain  extent,  true  within  the
BitTorrent system (Cohen 2003).
Additionally, it is also rare  that  nodes  can  spontaneously  change  their  specialism  if  they  come  to
recognise that  they  might be able to  do better  following a  different  role.  The  specialsim  of  the  node
tends to  be hard-coded or relies on user level switches. This kind of approach  limits the  ability of  the
system to  automatically  adapt to  changing  task  scenarios  –  however  see Montresor  (2004)  in  which
supernodes are dynamically allocated to improve performance.
Ideally, we would  like  a  more  general  approach  that  could be applied  to  a  range  of  different  task
domains  with  minimal  tuning.  We  would  like  the  approach  to  offer  dynamic  specialisation  and  re-
specialisation if nodes come to recognise they could do better  playing another  role and have the  ability
                                                
1This work partially supported by the EU within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS).
2The Gnutella home page: http://www.gnutella.com
3The Kazaa home page: http://www.kazaa.com
4The BitTorrent home page: http://www.bittorrent.com. See also Cohen (2003) for a description of the way BitTorrent works.
5 For example see the MLdonkey system: http://mldonkey.orgto do so or if the task domain changes requiring different kinds of skills to  be combined. In addition, we
want the  system to  be able to  deal with  freeriders  and  errant  or  malicious  nodes  but also  to  support
altruistic cooperation  between specialists when this is required for  job completion.  Finally,  we  require
this to be as scalable, self-organising and robust as possible.
In this paper we do not  claim to  have addressed all these issues to  the  level of deployment,  what we
propose  is, we claim, the  beginnings of an approach  that  may allow us  to  address these  issues. In  the
simulated scenarios so far implemented our results are very encouraging and we plan to continue this line
of work.
In  the  following  sections,  we  state  our  assumptions  concerning  behaviour  in  open  peer-to-peer
systems then  we introduce the  SLAC algorithm in general terms. We follow by formulating a minimal
task  domain  scenario  called the  SkillWorld,  to  which  we  wish  to  subject  a  simulated  P2P  network
running SLAC. We then describe how we apply SLAC within SkillWorld and present  some experiments
and results. We interpret the results and describe a “typical history” in the SkillWorld.
At the end of the paper we summarise what we have observed and what it means. We claim that  the
results  indicate  a  process  that  has  possibly  profound  implications  and  applications  beyond  just  P2P
systems.
2.  Behavioural  Assumptions  in  Open  Networks
How do nodes  behave  in  open  P2P  networks?  Of  course,  the  simple  answer is,  assuming  nodes  are
autonomous: anyway they like to behave!
Given this fact,  how then  do we  proceed  to  devise protocols  that  will  lead to  desired system-level
functions?  Obviously,  we  have  to  begin by making  assumptions  about  the  likely  behaviour of  other
nodes in the  network.  Such assumptions should be as realistic as possible but also simple  enough  to  be
practically  computable  and  transferable  between  a  number  of  domains.  Assumptions  made  here  are
essentially the axioms of a kind of mini social theory which then informs the design of peer software.
Many  approaches  (often  unconsciously)  inherit  assumptions  from  previous  social  sciences  (e.g.
economics, socio-biology, sociology). For example, if we assume nodes will behave “rationally” in the
context of classical game theory, then, we compute  “Nash equilibrium”  - as some researchers do – we
inherit  our assumptions from game-theory  which is a body of  knowledge assuming perfect  rationality
and perfect information. The basic approach is to assume that all individuals have perfect  knowledge of
the  game being played and all possible outcomes along with infinite  computational  time  and  common
knowledge that  all individuals are the  same in these respects. Given these assumptions it  is sometimes
possible to analytically derive the “Nash Equilibria” of the game being played. The idea is that  given the
previous classical assumptions any system will find and stay in a Nash Equilbria. However, it is unclear
that  such assumptions hold in dynamic open P2P  networks and the  derivation of such equilbria within
dynamic topologies and changing populations is currently beyond state-of-the-art analytical techniques.
In the  context  of socio-biological models (Trivers  1971,  Maynard-Smith 1982),  which are based on
the  evolution  of  behaviours  of  interacting  animals  over  time,  the  assumption  is that  behaviours  (or
strategies) reproduce in proportion to their  average fitness (utility or score) such that  fitter  behaviours
become  more  numerous  over  time.  Additionally  such models  assume  that  mutation  in  the  form  of
random changes in behaviour also take  place. This  evolutionary  game  theory approach  allows for  an
ecology of behaviours to evolve over time. In addition, there is no requirement that agents have perfect
rationality or perfect information – just enough, such that  better  performing  strategies tend to  increase
in the  population.  For biological systems this occurs via Darwinian  evolution  where  utility  equates to
fitness. However, P2P  networks don’t  evolve in a Darwinian fashion. Nodes don’t  reproduce and  it  is
unclear what “fitness” means in this context.
We have shown in recent  work that  results from evolutionary  models can be applied in networks if
we allow nodes the ability “copy and re-wire” within the network to  improve  their  own situation (Hales
2004, Hales 2005a, 2005b). This latter innovation demonstrates it is possible to  import  work originally
modelled in a conventional evolutionary framework into a dynamic network model. Nevertheless, in the
absence of any deductive proof  of the  equivalence of evolution  and the  re-wire rules it is necessary to
implement and test previous mechanisms to  determine if the  properties  of interest  can be carried over
into networks.
Summary of assumptions concerning open P2P networks:
1.  Nodes are in the network for what they can get out of it
2.  Nodes modify their behaviours to improve their individual benefit
3.  Nodes have limited knowledge about other peers and the network in generalThe first assumption would appear to be plausible within open P2P networks. In the currently popular
file sharing networks the  majority  of uses download and run  peer  client  software  (and  hence  join  the
network) in order to get something (e.g. to  download a movie or a music file). It certainly  is true that
some people would join  for  other  reasons.  For  example,  a  user may  join  to  feel  “part  of  an  online
community” (Strahilevitz 2003) or to distribute only their  own content  - not  downloading. Some could
aim to  damage the  functionality  of the  network by distributing malicious  content.  However,  we  argue
that neither of these motivations informs the majority of the  nodes. In any case, most functions would
be enhanced by purely altruistic behaviour (such  as distributing  content  without  downloading) and  we
conjecture that there are at least as many pure altruistic as pure malicious nodes in working networks.
The  second assumption is more problematic – who says nodes within a  given  P2P  network  change
behaviours to improve their benefit? Our argument here is rather  speculative -  if  not  conjectural.  We
start from the assumption of autonomy and argue that the function of peer client software is ultimately
under the  control  of  the  user. For  example,  users may  change  operating  system  or  client  software
settings (e.g. limiting upload speeds), download new versions of a peer client (e.g. incorporating  ways to
improve download success and rates) or simply hack their  own code if they  have the  required skills. Of
course, a hacked client can be distributed to others if it appears to have desirable properties and will tend
to  be adopted if it delivers those  properties  to  others.  We therefore  claim that  currently,  this kind  of
process is occurring at the  user level – via the  adoption  of various  clients  and  the  control  of  various
node-level settings. The problem hidden in this assumption is that the space of available behaviours that
each user can choose from varies over time and is also dependent on the knowledge of the user, the  kind
of network connection,  form of operating  system and many other  related  factors.  However,  we  note
that  similar assumptions have provided some insight into  human socio-cultural phenomena  at  least  as
complex as the socio-cultural phenomena of P2P systems (Binmore 1998).
Perhaps a more plausible way of thinking about the second assumption is to  interpret  the  space of all
available clients in a given P2P domain as the space of behaviours a user can select from – that is, a user
may change clients programs,  say  from  edonkey  to  BitTorrent  because edonkey  is too  slow for  the
content they required. The user has infact changed protocol and network completely – but that need not
matter  to  them,  and  in  fact  the  interpretation  then  is an  ecology  of  different  networks  with  users
switching between them.
Alternatively, the assumption that behaviour can change regularly within a single network can be seen
as a design proposal to  be incorporated  into  a new protocol,  rather  than  an interpretation  of  existing
protocols.
The third assumption would appear to be a necessary one in any large and highly dynamic system – it
is not practical or possible to collate accurate global statistics in most such systems.
3. The SLAC Algorithm
In previous work we showed how  a  simple  “copy  and  re-wire”  rule (or  protocol  or  algorithm)  could
produce  high-levels  of  cooperation  within  simulated  P2P  networks  performing  collective  tasks.  We
named  this  algorithm  “SLAC”  because  it  uses  Selfish  Link  and  behaviour  Adaptation  to  produce
Cooperation. We showed that  nodes  in  a  network  could emerge  cooperation  within  the  single-round
Prisoner’s  Dilemma  (PD)  game,  under,  what  we  argue, are  plausible assumptions  about  the  kinds  of
behaviour we find in P2P  systems. We also demonstrated  that  the  same results could carry over into  a
more realistic file-sharing P2P task domain (Hales 2004).
The  basic algorithm assumes that  peer nodes have the  freedom to  change behaviour (i.e. the  way
they handle and dispatch requests to and from other nodes) and drop and make links to nodes they  know
about.  In  addition,  it  is assumed nodes  have  the  ability  to  discover  other  nodes  randomly  from  the
network,  compare  their  performance  against  other  nodes  and  copy  the  links  and  (some  of)  the
behaviours of other nodes.
As discussed above, we assume that nodes will tend to use their abilities to  selfishly increase their  own
utility in a greedy and adaptive way (i.e. if changing some behaviour or link increases utility then  nodes
will tend to select it).
Over  time  nodes  engage in  some  activity  and  generate  some  measure  of  utility  U (this  might  be
number of files downloaded or jobs processed etc, depending on the domain).DO periodically forever
  select a random node j from the network
  compare utility of this node (i) with node j
  IF utility of j is higher (Uj >= Ui)
    drop all current links (clear view of i)
    copy links of node j (copy view from j to i)
    add link to j (add to view i a link to j)
    copy behavioural strategy of j
    with a low probability (mutation rate 1)
      drop all current links (clear view of i)
      add a link to a randomly chosen node
    with a low probability (mutation rate 2)
      change the behavioural strategy randomly
   END IF
END DO
Figure 1
The generic SLAC algorithm.
Each node executes this algorithm.
Periodically,  each  node  (i)  compares  its  performance  against  another  node  (j),  randomly  selected
from the population. If Ui < Uj node i drops all current links and copies all node j links and adds a link
to j itself. Also, periodically, and with low probability, each node adapts its behaviour and links in some
randomized way using a  kind  of  “mutation”  operation.  Mutation  of  the  links  involves  removing  all
existing  links  and  replacing  them  with  a  single link  to  a  node  randomly  drawn  from  the  network.
Mutation  of the  behaviour involves some form of randomized change - the  specifics being dictated by
the application domain (see later).
Previous “tag”  models,  from  which  SLAC  was  developed  (Hales  2005c)  have  indicated  that  for
good scalability properties the rate of mutation applied to the links needs to be higher, than that  applied
to the behaviour, by about one order of magnitude. In the context of the algorithm show in figure 1 this
means that “mutation rate 1” >> “mutation rate 2”.
When  applied  in  a  suitably  large  population,  over  time,  the  algorithm  follows  a  kind  of
evolutionary process in which nodes with high utility tend to  replace nodes with low utility with nodes
periodically changing behaviour and moving in the network. However, as will be seen, this does not  lead
to  the  dominance of selfish behaviour, as might  be intuitively  expected,  because a  form  of  incentive
mechanism emerges via a kind of ostracism in the network. The process can also be viewed as a kind of
“cultural group selection” process (see later discussion).
4.  The  SkillWorld  Scenario
In order  to  determine  if  the  SLAC  approach  can  support  specialisation  within  tribes  we  construct  a
abstract  and  minimal  simulated  task  domain  that  requires  nodes  to  perform  specialized  tasks
cooperatively in order to satisfy their individual needs. We call the  task domain SkillWorld and it is an
adaptation of a sociologically inspired scenario originally given in  Hales 2002.
The SkillWorld consists of a population of N nodes. Each node may have zero or more links (up to  a
maximum of 20) to other nodes. Links are undirected such that  the  entire  population  can be considered
as an undirected graph G with each vertex being a node and each edge being a link. Each vertex (or node)
is composed of three state variables – a “skill type”  s ε {1,2,3,4,5},  an “altruism flag” a ε {0,1} and a
satisfaction score or “utility” u ε R (where R is a positive real number).
Periodically, with uniform probability, a node i is selected from the  population  N. A “job” J is then
generated marked with a randomly chosen skill sJ. The  skill is selected,  again  randomly  with  uniform
probability, from the  domain {1,2,3,4,5}.  Job J is then  passed to  node i.  If  node  i posses  the  correct
matching skill (i.e. if si = sJ) then node i may process the  job itself without any help from other  nodes.
For successfully processing a job J the receiving node gains one unit of credit: u ← u + 1.This process of generating and passing jobs to nodes represents user-level requests for services – such
as, for example, searching for a particular file, performing some processing task or storing some data. In
the  SkillWorld we don’t  represent  the  actual jobs to  be done, rather,  we represent  the  skill required to
perform the job. In our minimal scenario, each job only requires one skill to be completed.
But what if node i receives a job for which it does not  have the  correct  skill (i.e. if si ≠ sJ) ? In this
case i passes the job request to each neighbour in turn until all have been visited or one of them, j, agrees
to  process the  job J. A neighbour j will only agree  to  process  J if  its  skill matches  (sj  = sJ) and  the
altruism flag is set (aj = 1). If j does agree to process the job then this costs j a quarter unit of utility (uj
← uj – 0.25) yet increases the utility of i by one unit (ui ← ui + 1).
What this means is that node i looks for an altruistic neighbour with the correct skill to  process job J.
If  i finds such a  neighbour  (j) it  increases  its  utility  as  if it  had  completed  the  job  itself  whereas  j
decreases its utility. This reflects the  notion  that  j is altruistically processing J for the  benefit of i and
that users are happy when jobs submitted to their nodes are completed but are not happy when jobs from
other nodes use their node resources with no immediate benefit to themselves.
5.  SLAC  in  the  SkillWorld
We apply the SLAC algorithm within SkillWorld by making the  node skill types  and the  altruism flags
into  evolvable state  variables such that  they  are copied from more successful  nodes (based on  utility)
and mutated occasionally with low probability.
Although SLAC has previously been demonstrated  as successful in promoting  cooperation  in  both  a
Prisoner’s Dilemma playing scenario (Hales 2005) and a simple file-sharing scenario (Hales 2004)  it has
not  yet  been  applied  within  a  scenario  requiring intra-group  (or  tribe)  specialisation  in  addition  to
altruism. We are therefore  asking a lot from a simple algorithm:  to  self-organise  the  population  into
altruistic yet internally specialised tribes that pass and process jobs using their various skills.
The SkillWorld is the simplest scenario we could think of that captures a process of specialisation for
this initial investigation. We have a small number of skills (five in these simulations) and we only pass
jobs to immediate neighbours. Each node and job is related to a single skill only (rather  than  a subset of
skills which would seem more realistic). Also we assume nodes can change skills at  will  (randomly  via
mutation).  This  latter  assumption  might  not  hold  if  skills  relate  to  physical  or  unchangeable
characteristics of nodes like storage or bandwidth for example. However,  at  this  stage  we  leave  more
realistic scenarios with multi-hop passing and more complex skill set arrangements to future work.
In order to measure the success of SLAC we take a simple measure - the  proportion  of submitted jobs
that are completed. We can infer that a network in which the  majority  of jobs submitted are completed
is sustaining internally cooperative and specialised tribes since the only way to complete most jobs is for
nodes to pass them to altruistic neighbours with required skills.
5.1  Some  Experiments  and  Results
Initially we ran a set of simulation experiments  in which we initialised all nodes in the  population  with
uniformly randomly selected skills, altruism flags and links. We experimented with a number of network
sizes determining for each how many cycles before the high performance was achieved (a single cycle is
the time unit by which all nodes will have executed the SLAC algorithm at least once, on average).
In order to measure the success of SLAC we take a simple measure - the  percentage of submitted jobs
that  are completed (PCJ). We can  infer  that  a  network  in  which  the  majority  of  jobs submitted  are
completed is sustaining internally cooperative and specialised groupings (or tribes) since the only way to
complete most jobs is for nodes to pass them to altruistic neighbours with the required skills.
We categorized “high performance”  as a PCJ > 90%, we found that  in the  simulations  this  was  the
highest stable value reached, and ran simulations until this value was obtained - recording the  number of
cycles required. Hence, if SLAC was working well in the  SkillWorld we would hope that  within a small
number of cycles the PCJ would become high.
We used a mutation rate of 0.001 on skill type  s and altruism flag a (shown in figure 1 as “mutation
rate 2”). Mutation  on the  links (shown in  figure 1  as “mutation  rate  1”)  was  an  order  of  magnitude
higher (0.01).  We carry over this assumption – that  the  mutation  rate  on  the  links  should be higher
than that on the “strategies” – from previous experimental  work comparing several different scenarios
and models (Hales 2005c).  We  fixed  the  maximum  number  of  links  between  nodes  to  20.  Links  are
undirected and therefore symmetric. If an operation results a node requiring a new link and it already has
the maximum then a random link is discarded by the node and the new link accepted. Using this methodnodes never refuse new links but may often lose old ones. This adds to  the  noisy and dynamic nature of
the scenario.
Figure 2
Number of cycles to high performance for different network sizes. When PCJ > 90% this means that
over 90% of all jobs submitted to nodes are completed. Note: overlapping circles have identical
values.
Figure 2b
Number of cycles to high performance for different network sizes when all nodes are initialised selfish
(a = 0). This can be compared to the random initialisation results in figure 2. Note that there is a reverse
scaling cost here. The results for N = 1000 are worse than shown since three outliers at about 1000
cycles are not shown here.
Figure 2 shows results from 30 individual simulation runs. Each point  is a different run  showing the
first cycle at which the  PCJ > 90%. As can be seen, high performance  is attained  within a few tens of
cycles even for networks of size N = 10
5. Notice that  there  appears to  be a very slight upward trend in
cycles as N increases, however, this is negligible – the  results  therefore  indicate  close  to  zero scaling
cost. This highly desirable property was also evidenced in a previous application of SLAC to  a simulated
fire-sharing scenario (Hales 2005).  Figure 2b shows results  under the  same  conditions  except  that  all
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Jnodes are initialised to  be selfish (a = 0). This gives a kind of “worst case scenario” as far as altruism
evolving. It is important  to  show that  the  system can escape  from  this,  since  this  demonstrates  that
even if a complete  failure of node altruism should occur (either  through  chance  or  malicious  attacks)
then  the  system can recover  relatively  quickly. We notice  here the  reverse scaling properties  that  we
originally  noticed  and  analysed  in  a  previous  “tag”  model  (Hales  2000).  Essentially,  with  bigger
populations, there is more likelihood of the chance formation of a small altruistic tribe. This then  goes
on to “seed” the population with altruism6.
Interestingly, it was found that  for populations  where N < 1000  high performance  was not produced
even when runs were extended to several thousand cycles. Intuitively  this is consistent  with the  “group
selection” hypothesis  concerning  how  SLAC  operates.  With  small  populations  there  are  not  enough
nodes to form enough competing groups (or tribes) so evolution can not operate at the group level.
5.2 History in the SkillWorld – Tribal Dynamics
One  way  to  convey  the  dynamics  of  a  typical  SkillWorld  simulation  run  is  to  describe  a  typical
“history” in narrative form – this method is sometimes used in computational  sociology, particularly in
work  with  artificial  societies  (Epstein  and  Axtell  1996,  Axelrod  1995)  carried  over  from  more
traditional  sociological  methods  of  explanation.  In  the  rest  of  this  section  we  give  such  a  “typical
history”.  Although we will make general points  we  will  also  refer  to  a  specific  single simulation,  run
given in Figure 3, to illustrate our analysis.
Figure 3
The time series of a typical single run in SkillWorld (N=1000). Shown are the number of
selfish nodes as a proportion of the entire population (selfish), the proportion of completed
jobs submitted (PCJ), the clustering coefficient (C), the number of components in the
population (comps, which is normalised by dividing by 60) and the average probability that
a route exists between any two nodes (conprob).
Initially, the  SkillWorld is a random graph, all nodes are connected  via a few hops and  clustering  is
low. Skills and  altruism  are  randomly  scattered.  Very quickly,  the  graph  breaks  into  a  population  of
many disconnected components  because nodes quickly re-wire themselves to  better  performing  nodes.
                                                
6 See Hales (2000)  for a more detailed  explanation  of  this  reverse-scaling  cost  including  the  beginnings  of  an  analytical
treatment.
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selfish PCJ C comps conprobThe better performing nodes are initially the non-altruists who exploit  their  groups (or tribes) selfishly.
However, this is a non-sustainable strategy  since this exploitation  causes nodes to  leave their  exploited
tribes and join tribes in which there is less exploitation – nodes in tribes with less exploiters  in them  do
better  (higher utility) because they  are  cooperating  as a  team.  The  tribes  dominated  by non-altruists
quickly “wither away” as nodes leave. When  no nodes are left then  the  tribe no-longer exist – in  this
way tribes die, even though nodes do not die. This emergent property  of the  birth and death of tribes
lays the ground for evolution to operate that the group (tribe) level.
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Figure 4
Details showing just a small part of the entire population for the same typical run
as show in figure 3. From an initially random graph disconnected components (we
call tribes) emerge with internal specialisation and rich structure. The numbers in
the nodes represent the node skill type.7
Figure 3 indicates the above process occurring in the first 10 cycles or so. Notice that  the  number of
selfish nodes peaks, and the  proportion  of completed jobs (PCJ) bottoms  out, at about  cycle  10.  The
number  of  components  (i.e.  tribes)  increases  in  the  early  phase  peaking  just  before  cycle  20
(representing a peak of 60 components).
Altruistic tribes function  well and  grow as more  nodes  join,  new tribes  are  occasionally  formed  as
nodes randomly, through mutation,  split from a tribe.  As altruistic  tribes  grow larger  they  eventually
become “infected” or “invaded” by a non-altruist node – either by mutation of an existing member node
                                                
7 Full sized pictures can be found at http://www.davidhales.com/esoa05pics.or the entering of a new node to the tribe. When this happens the tribe is quickly destroy via dispersion
since a non-altruist will exploit the tribe selfishly and this will lead to many more nodes quickly copying
that  node until the  tribe “dies” because all nodes leave it – because a tribe dominated  by selfish  nodes
gives lower utility to all nodes within it than one dominated by altruists.
Figure 3 shows, from about cycle 20 onward, the  above process occurring. A decrease in the  number
of components  (comps) and an increase in completed jobs (PCJ) are correlated with a decrease in  the
number of selfish nodes (selfish). This is because altruistic tribes grow in size – reducing the  total  number
of components  (comps) and reducing selfish nodes (selfish). By about cycle 30 selfishness  is very  low
and completed jobs (PCJ) reaches a high level. Notice that  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  formation  and
dissolution of the  tribes is reflected in the  variation  of the  number of components  over time  (comps)
after PCJ goes high.
History in the SkillWorld is the history of the  formation,  growth and destruction of tribes. From the
simple  rules of  the  SLAC  algorithm  an  evolutionary  process  emerges  at  the  tribal  or  group  level.
Essentially  one  can  think  of  this  evolution  as  the  competition  between  tribes  to  retain  nodes  to
continue to exist. This process is in constant flux due to mutation and movement, no equilibrium state is
attained and no tribe lasts forever. As long as new altruistic tribes are created at least as rapidly as they
are destroyed then altruism can survive.
Figure 4 shows a small detail of snapshots of the population over time (space does not permit  full size
snapshots). As can be seen, tribes quickly emerge and grow, producing various structures and sizes with
internally specialised nodes.
5.3 Tribal Structures
Within the SkillWorld, tribes with different structures and skill mixes will support different levels of
utility – a highly connected  tribe with an even mix of skills would  produce  better  results  than  a  tribe
missing some skill. Hence, selection at the tribe level (group selection) will tend to  operate  to  structure
the tribes into more optimal structures of skill types. We would therefore expect to  see tribes composed
of nodes possessing each skill type linked together such that a node receiving a job can either  process it
directly  or  will  be directly  linked  to  a  node  with  the  appropriate  skill willing to  do the  job.  In  the
SkillWorld then, we have tribe level selection not only operating  to  control  selfishness but also to  tune
the internal (organisational) structure of the tribe.
We find this particularly exciting since we believe that  by increasingly  the  complexity  of  the  task
domains and giving nodes a little more freedom to hop more than one link within their tribe it should be
possible to evolve tribes with complex  organisational  structures tuned to  performing  in the  given task
domain. Moreover, since the tribes are constantly evolving they should be able to change  their structure
dynamically to address a change in the task domain8.
6.  Conclusion
We  have  demonstrated  that  the  SLAC  algorithm  can  be  applied  in  a  scenario  (the  SkillWorld)
requiring node specialisation in addition to  the  suppression of selfish behaviour. When  the  algorithm is
executed  the  network  quickly  divides  into  competing  “tribes”  (disconnected  components).  An
evolutionary  process then  emerges at the  group level selecting  efficient  internally  specialised tribes  –
which deliver high levels of service with respect to user submitted jobs at the nodes.
We  adapted  the  SkillWorld scenario  from  a  previous  model  developed  for  the  purposes  of  social
scientific theorising (Hales 2002). The previous “tag-based” model relied on mean-field mixing (with no
population structure) and followed a conventional evolutionary process.
                                                
8 Further experiments  not  detailed  here, demonstrate  that  even when all skills  in the population  are initialised  to the  same
single type – the network quickly adapts into an even skill  spread due to mutation  on the skills  and selection  at the tribe
level.Our belief that the SLAC algorithm works via a kind of group selection occurring at the  level of the
“tribe”  gave  us  the  a  priori expectation  that  it  would  select  tribes  that  could  perform  well  in  the
SkillWorld. In this sense, dare we claim the beginning  of a “proto-theory” allowing us to  make  some
modest qualitative predictions?
More  generally,  we  claim  that  this  paper  demonstrates  concretely  within  a  dynamic  network  the
emergence  of  what  has  been  termed  a  “meta-state  transition”  (MST)  within  evolution  (Heylighen
1992). It has been argued that  the  emergence of life itself and major steps in biological evolution  (e.g.
multi-cellular organisms) and social evolution  (e.g. large complex  societies) occur over such MST’s. In
this context we advance our results as possibly of great theoretical insight.
It is important to understand that the concept of the “tribe” is actually a theoretical construct we use
to help to explain and understand the emergent phenomena produced by the SLAC algorithm over time.
The tribes are not “programmed” into  the  nodes a priori but rather  emerge from the  interplay  of task
domain, interaction and the SLAC algorithm. We use the concept of “tribes” because we believe it to  be
valuable in beginning to  understand,  control  and  theorise  about  what  is occurring  in  SLAC  networks.
However, since the  tribes are emergent we do not  begin with a  “theory  of  tribes”  rather  we  observe,
experiment  and induce knowledge about them.  As discussed below, this does not  preclude,  but,  in  fact,
should support, the formation of an analytical theory – we hope.
Since the nodes do not die or model genetic operators, the  tribe level selection process can be viewed
as a kind of artificial cultural group selection process. What is quite extraordinary  is that  such a simple
node level algorithm  (SLAC) based on a few plausible assumptions  about  preferential attachment  can
lead to such complex and useful group level evolutionary dynamics.
A key issue however, is that,  although SLAC is simple to  implement  the  dynamics are complex  and
currently it is not  know how analytical tools can be applied to  truly understand, predict and prove  the
properties  of  SLAC.  So  far  the  only  “proofs”  we  have  are  in  the  form  of  “existence  proofs”
demonstrated by empirical analysis of simulation runs. Such “proofs”  are not  watertight and can always
be questioned  given  anomalous  results  from  future  simulation  studies (rather  like  experiments  in  the
natural sciences). We have some confidence in the  general results from SLAC-like algorithms however
(such as those  based purely on “tags”) since there  have been a number of replications of  those  results
from  multiple  independent  implementations  using  different  languages,  machines  and  programmers
(Edmonds and Hales 2003).  However, none of this offers predictive insight into  the  process as a good
analytical model would. What  we currently have is a kind of  “toolbox”  of  algorithmic  heuristics  that
appear to be reasonably robust over some minimal task domains and scenarios.
However,  currently,  the  only  way  to  apply  these  methods  to  new  domains  is  to  simulate  and
experiment – copying and adapting heuristics that worked previously in similar domains. Perhaps  this is
not  so  far  away from  the  edit  / compile  /  debug  cycle  of  good  old-fashioned  software  engineering
(GOFSE). This could bode well for future progress.
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